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12 October 1979

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 56/79)



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

(FOUO 56/79)

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOIGT INTERVIEWED ON FRANCO-GERMAN MILITARY COOPERATION

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 27 Aug- 2 Sep 79 p 23

[Interview with Deputy Karsten Voigt, SPD spokesman, by Gerard Sandoz: "No to the Franco-German Bomb"; date and place not given]

[Text] Deputy Karsten Voigt, former president of Jusos (Socialist Youth), is one of the most brilliant representatives of the young generation of German social democrats. A close friend of Willy Brandt, Voigt is a defense problems and foreign policy expert. He is given close attention because he is the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] spokesman within the Bundestag Foreign Policy Commission, where he deals primarily with defense problems. He answers here the question that LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR asked in its number 771, 20 August issue: "Should Nuclear Arms be Shared with the Germans?" Judging by the liveliness of the responses in both the French press and several American newspapers, it seems the debate has only begun.

[Question] In a debate published here last week, Georges Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti proposed that France and Germany associate to build a common nuclear defense. Does this idea appear realistic or not to you, were it for a very long term?

[Answer] SPD does not wish West Germany to become a nuclear military power either with France's help or the help of another country.

[Question] Then you categorically reject this proposition?

[Answer] I think a closer cooperation between France and Germany in the areas of armament and armament control would certainly be a positive thing. This cooperation is a necessary element of European defense, but it must not be directed against the Third World.

[Question] You are talking about close cooperation on conventional armaments exclusively?

[Answer] Naturally.

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[Question] In short, the German opinion is that it is still sufficiently protected by the American atomic umbrella? But, isn't this protection less credible today than it was immediately after the war?

[Answer] The German opinion is that it can't imagine being able to renounce American military and nuclear protection.

[Question] But what if it is America who renounces? Do you believe, for example, the United States would use atomic weapons to defend Berlin?

[Answer] It's true the situation in Europe has changed since USSR and the United States are at nuclear parity. At present we are having many talks about it with the Americans. But these new problems can not be solved by a nuclear collaboration between France and Germany. I believe, to be realistic, that no solution of this kind can be drawn up counter to the United States, who by its very presence remains an important factor in European security. To think that Europe can be totally militarily independent of the United States seems illusory to me.

[Question] Georges Buis estimates that USSR would not react so violently as is expected, if Germany were endowed with nuclear arms. Is this also your view?

[Answer] No. USSR would react very violently. I have no doubt of it. The first result would be to reopen to question the MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Forces) discussions and the SALT III compromise. Moreover, the entire European equilibrium would be upset. That is not at all what we are seeking. We think European security depends upon both American and Soviet armament reduction, not upon escalation, which is strongly implied by the hypotheses of a Franco-German nuclear strength.

[Question] Is everyone in Germany of your opinion?

[Answer] In the past, Strauss has called for military collaboration with France. Today he has probably changed his mind.

[Question] Is he a candidate for the chancellery?

[Answer] Ask him. But I would add two things. First, I consider the European overture expressed by Sanguinetti and Buis to be extremely positive. Next, I agree with Buis when he says that France, for technological reasons (and not only technological) is today no longer a "sanctuary." However, I do not draw the same conclusion from that. Rather than considering a Franco-German nuclear force, I believe that the French policy of nonparticipation in MBFR and SALT III negotiations puts France dangerously outside the game. Certainly there is in it the expression of national sovereignty, but also there is a sort of deliberately chosen isolation. Now, can one isolate oneself when one is no longer, truly, a sanctuary?

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

AIR TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT SUGGESTIONS PRESENTED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 25 Aug 79 pp 35-36

/Text/ During a press conference held in Brussels on 13 August the heads of the General Directorate of Transportation of the European Communities Commission /ECC/ initiated the memorandum communicated by the commission to the EC Council dealing with ways to improve and develop air transport services within the EC;

Four Objectives

The memorandum asks that consideration be given to the interests:

--of the users: by the creation of as complete a network of airlines as possible on which efficient services should be offered at the lowest possible prices and without discrimination;

--of the airline companies: whose financial balance should be assured, development costs reduced and productivity increased;

--of the airline company personnel: for whom social progress should be continually sought, particularly by eliminating any obstacles to free access to employment;

--of the group as a whole: whose living conditions should be improved, particularly through measures aimed at protecting the quality of life and environment (airport noise), promoting regional development, and the like.

Aware that competition is limited by state intervention, the EC believes it could profit by stimulating a tendency toward increased productivity in the air transport system; the result would be a reduction in prices by introducing certain competitive aspects and making way for innovation.

Short and Medium-term Measures

In this spirit the memorandum proposes a series of actions over the short and medium terms:

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Lower Fares and Greater Flexibility in the Services

Travel arrangements could be made on a multilateral basis making it possible to reduce fares in the most active situations. These arrangements could provide for:

- the introduction of a third class;
- the introduction of special fares for a certain percentage of the space available on condition that the fare be paid in advance and not be reimbursable or be only partially reimbursable, if the passenger decides to delay his trip;
- the introduction of an off-season ticket from one point to another in addition to which one could buy supplementary services, such as reservations, interchangeability and the like;
- the offer of a specific percentage of the weekly space available on the routes in question at a fare which is not more than 50 to 60 percent of that of the economy class;
- the introduction of an excursion ticket in Europe;
- the general application of stand-by rates.

If the airlines refused to go along with these reduced fares, the ECC should have provisions whereby the governments in question would authorize the establishment of a limited number of services at the same rate by other companies operating on those same lines.

Moreover, a radical step which could be taken to innovate regular air services between EC countries would be to conclude agreements stipulating that, if an airline of an EC country planned in accordance with the authorities who grant licences in the country in which the airline operates to introduce new lines toward points of another EC country or to offer services of another type involving innovations in rate schedules or commercial policy, the member state should not be permitted to refuse authorization to establish the proposed service after a certain period of consultation.

Along this line the ECC is also contemplating measures capable of developing international traffic between regional centers and with the use of irregular flights. The commission is likewise suggesting a common approach in the coordination of aid granted to airlines by the various states, respect of the principle of the right to set up business in the air transport sector, stabilization of the rates of change used in establishing air fares and a plan for compensating passengers who have been the victims of overreserving by the airlines.

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#### Measures Aimed at Reducing Airline Operating Costs

The commission intends to promote simplification in the procedures and documents used in international air freight transportation, particularly in the area of programs aimed at achieving customs unification and fiscal agreement. Other possibilities for reducing airline operating costs are offered in the area of standardization of the technical norms applicable to aircraft, a sector in which work has already been done.

#### Action Relative to Personnel

The commission has initiated a comparative study on working conditions in the air transport industry in the EC and will decide on what action to take based on the results of that study. Measures will also be taken to introduce mutual recognition of the licences of aircrews and land-based personnel.

#### Relations With Third-World Countries

The commission believes it important to make an opportune evaluation of problems of common interest which might arise between the EC countries and the Third World on the subject of air transport. Therefore, it plans to suggest that the council set up a procedure for consultation between the member states and the commission on questions of air transport handled by international organizations and on the subject of negotiations with Third-World countries.

Lastly, the commission notes that the growth of the air transport activity should result in an increased demand for aircraft and that the European aircraft industry should be able to profit by that demand. The commission is making an effort to encourage and support substantial research on the development of new aircraft. It will also encourage meetings between the airlines and aircraft manufacturers to enable the industry to benefit from the experience of the airlines with regard to operational aspects and their future needs.

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF BUNDESWEHR DESCRIBED

Moscow BUNDESVER I NATO: ISTORIYA SOZDANIYA I RAZVITIYA VOORUZHENNYKH SIL  
FEDERATIVNOY RESPUBLIKI GERMANII (1955-1978) (The Bundeswehr and NATO: His-  
tory of Establishment and Development of the Armed Forces of the Federal  
Republic of Germany (1955-1978)) in Russian 1979 signed to press 8 Jan 79 pp 2,  
271, 3-4, 253-261

[Annotation, table of contents, introduction, and conclusion from book by  
N. K. Glazunov, Voenizdat, 30,000 copies, 271 pages]

[Text] On the basis of a wealth of documentary material, for the most part  
West German, the author analyzes the process of development of the armed  
forces of the FRG from the moment of its overt arming (1955-1978). The  
author shows the specific features of the stage-by-stage building of the army  
and navy, their place and role in the military system of the FRG and in NATO,  
and reveals prevailing views in the Bundeswehr on the function and combat  
employment of the armed forces branches and arms.

This book is intended for officers and general officers, students and cadets  
enrolled in military educational institutions, as well as all readers with  
an interest in the military-political development of West Germany following  
World War II.

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## INTRODUCTION

Almost 30 years have passed since a separate German state -- the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) -- was established on German soil lying west of the Elbe as a result of the divisive policy of the Western powers, headed by the United States. At that time reaction and militarism led this part of Germany along the road of reestablishment of the power of the monopolies, that is, of those same forces which had already more than once drawn the German people and the neighboring European countries into the abyss of devastating wars. Since that time there has been taking place in West Germany a process of intensified militarization and growth of revanchist and neofascist forces. Former Hitler generals and officers, not satisfied with the establishment of West German armed forces within the framework of the Paris agreements, demanded nuclear missile weapons for them and are endeavoring to place the aggressive NATO alliance of imperialist nations in the service of their own military objectives.

We might recall that throughout the course of centuries Germany's ruling classes cultivated the ideology of violent force and racial superiority. Their aggressive policy had serious consequences for the fate not only of the peoples of the neighboring countries but of the Germans themselves. Devastating wars began here, at the center of the European continent; a wall of fire passed through the peaceful towns and villages of countries

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lying to the east and west of Germany. And after each bloody clash, following new victims on both sides, discord and enmity became more aggravated. One might say that a historical accumulation of hatred was occurring. "Fascism," stated L. I. Brezhnev in Berlin on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of establishment of the GDR, "which visited terrible calamity on the peoples of Europe, including the German people, was a monstrous culmination of the evil engendered by German imperialism. Fascist aggression in World War II deepened to an even greater extent the gulf between Germany and the other countries."\*

Today's Bonn militarists and reactionary forces, taking the most aggressive and extremist positions, are laying persistent claim to the role of second leader of the NATO alliance and are endeavoring to breathe new life into this instrument of preparation of aggression against the socialist countries. Max Reimann, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, stated in 1969 that West German imperialism has once again become one of the strongest bastions in the system of world imperialism. Its aggressive character proceeds from its economic potential and the specific features of its historical development. The military-political strategy of West German imperialism is aimed directly against the socialist nations.\*\* Creation at the western borders of the nations of the socialist community of a new military force in the form of the West German Bundeswehr and the NATO Joint Forces was a culmination point of the postwar policy of the Western powers.

This book presents a historical investigation primarily of the second period in the military development of the Federal Republic of Germany (1955-1978) -- of the most complex military-political phenomenon in its history, when a decisive element in the country's overall militarization was the establishment of its own military force. This period most strongly draws the attention of historians and political commentators and remains on the front pages of the press, for the intensified arming of West Germany is engendering many problems in Europe, the most important of which is European security.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Republic of Germany, the cementing link among the European NATO member nations, has made every effort to strengthen this bloc. On 18 March 1971 the Bonn Government, responding to questions by representatives of the majority (SDP-FDP) and opposition (CDU/CSU) factions in the Bundestag, stated that the NATO alliance is an "essential condition" for the security of this country and its partners, that preservation of "a global balance remains essential" and that in order to achieve this it is necessary to maintain in

\* Brezhnev, L. I. "Leninskim kursom" [Following a Leninist Course], Vol 5, Moscow, 1976, page 152.

\*\* "Mezhdunarodnoye soveshchaniye Kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy. Dokumenty i materialy" [International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties. Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1969, page 96.

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Europe "an adequate quantity of manpower and weapons."<sup>1</sup> Seven years later Federal Chancellor H. Schmidt stated during a visit to the FRG (4-7 May 1978) by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, that "our security is based to a substantial degree on our membership in NATO" and that "the existence of a military-political balance of power is an essential condition for the security of everybody in Europe."<sup>2</sup>

In building up Germany's armed forces, chiefly conventional, the FRG's political and military leaders proceed from the position that "the phase of a bipolar dominance in world politics, in spite of the extended superiority of the two great powers, has passed the culmination point in its development" and that "the freedom of action" of the great powers is limited by the existence of a "nuclear stalemate." During L. I. Brezhnev's visit to the FRG, Chancellor H. Schmidt spoke out in advocacy of "stabilization of the strategic nuclear potential at a lower level...." But at the same time he called for efforts to reduce the allegedly "presently existing imbalance" in the area of conventional armaments and in the area of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. This capabilities reassessment, made in Bonn in the 1970's, places a clear imprint on the military development of the FRG within the NATO system and on its position in Western Europe, a position which is growing stronger year by year, as West Germany's military prestige increases among its NATO partners.

The thesis on the necessity of arming in order to maintain the "balance of power" established between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries on the one hand and the nations of the capitalist West on the other, a balance which is being allegedly disturbed by the Warsaw Pact member nations, obviously proceeds from official positions. The principle of maintaining a "balance of power" is also continuing into the future as the leitmotif of the military policy of the government of the FRG. It determines all the actions of the European NATO member nations and is being used to justify continuation of the arms race. "The Federal Government formulates its policy," states the 1971/72 "White Book," with the aim of maintaining sufficient military potential. "Precisely for this reason it makes every effort to promote strengthening of NATO military might. An example of this is the FRG's share of the overall program of increasing military expenditures adopted by the 10 European NATO members...." This same government document stated that the principle of "balance of power" cannot be violated by the existence of government treaties with the USSR and Poland, future treaties or agreements with Czechoslovakia and the GDR, treaties on rejection of the use of force, on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, or a possible Soviet-American agreement on strategic arms limitations.

The nations of the socialist community, which advocate political détente in Europe, supplemented by military détente -- a reduction of the arms race and holding it in check, cannot accept this interpretation of "balance of power." As is well known, the Soviet Union has advanced an entire program of military détente: this program includes pledging not to initiate the employment of nuclear weapons, not to expand existing forces, and to limit the number of troops taking part in maneuvers. But the statements made by a number of

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political and military leaders of the Western countries, including the FRG, continue to contain allegations that the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact member nations have established for themselves on the European continent a "military superiority" over the NATO countries and are continuing to build up their forces in Europe. These tendentious allegations are thus creating conditions for continuation of the arms race in the NATO countries.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev decisively refuted such allegations in his replies to questions put to him by VORWAERTS, a weekly published by the German Social Democratic Party, commenting that "a military balance indisputably exists in Europe, where the main forces of the two military-political groupings are in the closest propinquity." The question is quite different: must this balance be maintained at such a high level? As regards the global balance of power between the principal members of both military-political groupings, that is, the Soviet Union and the United States, continued Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his replies, here too, as both sides have officially acknowledged, "an approximate parity, that is, a balance of strategic forces, has been established and is being maintained."<sup>3</sup>

Certain circles in the FRG have in recent years been pursuing with particular persistence the thesis of the impossibility of ensuring West Germany's "independence and inviolability" with that country's own forces, arguing the necessity of "the continued presence of U.S. troops in Europe at the current strengths" and advocate strengthening military cooperation among the NATO countries. The 1971/72 "White Book" emphasized that even the very largest military contributions by the West European countries could not replace U.S. strategic weapons and the U.S. troop presence in Europe, as well as the loss of U.S. "military and deterrent potential."

A decisive event in determining the role of the European countries in NATO was the December 1970 meeting of defense ministers of the ten member nations, at which the document "NATO Defense in the 1970's" (AD-70) was ratified on 2 December, and a program for further strengthening this military alliance was adopted. Both documents contained a reappraisal of the balance of power between West and East, the capabilities and strategic concepts of each of the Allies in light of their conformity with changing situation conditions. The most important consequence proceeding from the documents was for the FRG acknowledgment that the strategy of "flexible response" and the concept of "forward defense," which strengthen West Germany's leader status in the military alliance, continue to be the foundation of military planning. They enable West Germany to continue development of its conventional forces, building them up quantitatively and qualitatively.

Certain circles in West Germany see benefits for themselves in implementation of the new NATO program and a chance to seize leadership in Europe. Typical in this respect is another thesis contained in that same "White Book": "Cooperation among the European Allies serves the interests of stabilization of the balance of power, promotes fuller utilization of European reserves, gives new forms to the partnership with the United States, and brings closer resolution of the question of forming a united Europe, which constitutes a prerequisite for strengthening political and military-political integration. The government of the FRG intends first of all to carry out integrated

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projects in the area of weapons development, establishment of a common rear services support system and a uniform combat training system." Such a partnership is also entirely to the liking of West Germany's military leaders, for unification of military forces is being implemented around West Germany and its Bundeswehr.

Military-political integration enabled the FRG to conduct combat training of its ground and air forces at the field training facilities of France, Denmark, Greece, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, and Canada. It stimulated growth of West Germany's military industry and participation by West German specialists in the development of new-model weapons jointly with leading NATO partners. Supplying its equipment to other NATO countries and occupying command positions in NATO military-political bodies, West Germany is counting on utilizing the troops of its allies in its own interests.

Reactionary circles in the West, whipping up a farfetched campaign over a "Soviet military threat," in actuality do not wish to accept the present approximate balance in military forces and would seek superiority. But such an approach stimulates a new unchecked arms production race and is fraught with the danger of military adventures. It is not surprising that from time to time voices in the West speak out about their readiness to mount "powerful, devastating, preemptive strikes." The Soviet Union has never nurtured plans of mounting a "first strike." In addition, it submitted an official proposal to all participants in the all-European conference, including the United States, to sign an agreement pledging not to initiate the employment of nuclear weapons against one another. But the NATO countries, as L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his replies to questions put by the SPD weekly VOR-WAERTS, decline this proposal, fairly clearly indicating that they have no desire to abandon their "plans of launching a first strike against our country." The Soviet Union resolutely opposes a "balance of terror"; it advocates a balance of trust.

Relations between the USSR and Germany had developed variously during the course of the present century. Prominent German diplomat Ulrich Brockdorf Rantzau, who served as ambassador to Moscow in the 1920's, wrote in 1922 in a brief report to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Eastern policy: "There was a time when Germany and Russia maintained good-neighbor relations; their paths have parted, to the detriment of both peoples."<sup>4</sup> In the postwar period relations of fraternal friendship and cooperation were established between the Soviet Union and the German worker-peasant state -- the German Democratic Republic, which is successfully building socialism.

For an extended period of time relations with the other German state were exactly opposite. From the very establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany its ruling circles, stated a West German publication, "for many long years cultivated outright animosity toward the East,"<sup>5</sup> rejecting out of hand, without even looking into them, any proposals pertaining to matters of peace and cooperation emanating from the Soviet Union. The FRG's policy of revision of the results of World War II, its territorial claims on its neighbors, and its unchecked militarization were constantly poisoning the

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political atmosphere on the continent, evoking distrust on the part of the European peoples toward the FRG's policy, which constituted a continuous threat to European security.

The Bundeswehr was established during the period in power of a coalition of reactionary parties, CDU/CSU, with the active political, financial and material support of the Western powers, particularly the United States. During the 20 years (1949-1969) during which this coalition was in power there took place the remilitarization of West Germany, this country joined the aggressive NATO bloc, established its own armed forces and turned them over to this military alliance. In spite of positive changes in the foreign policy of the SPD/FDP coalition, which has been in power since 1969, the opposition CDU/CSU parties continue to maintain a strong influence in the Bundeswehr and to pursue the policy of strengthening its role in the country's affairs.

The treaty between the USSR and the FRG signed in Moscow on 12 August 1970 served as a stabilizing factor in the further development of the foreign policy, and especially the "Eastern policy" of West Germany. It essentially consists in acknowledgment by both parties of the territorial status quo established in Europe as a result of the last war. The treaty formally states the inviolability of European borders, and in particular the border between the GDR and the FRG, as well as the Oder-Neisse line, which became the western boundary of the Polish People's Republic. For the first time the FRG assumed the obligation, possessing the force of international law, strictly to observe the territorial integrity of all the nations of Europe within their present boundaries and to make no territorial claims, either now or in the future.

The treaty between the USSR and the FRG, which comprises a guarantee of the status quo in today's Europe, constitutes one of the most important political documents of our time. It signifies a great victory for the peace-seeking foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Pledges to observe the inviolability of the political boundary between the FRG and the GDR and the territorial integrity of the latter attest to the defeat of a trend, which had prevailed for a period of two decades, toward non-recognition of the prevailing political and governmental-territorial situation on German soil. The treaty offers every possibility to put an end once and for all to the revanchist policy of reactionary circles and to become an important element in maintaining stability and tranquility on the European continent under the condition of strict observance of this treaty.

The future will show how seriously the FRG has taken upon itself these obligations and whether it will continue to follow its present foreign policy. One should not forget the presence in West Germany of the revanchist-mood CDU/CSU party bloc and the growth of neo-Nazi forces. Some politicians continue to hold to the senseless and long-since obsolete formulas of the "Adenauer era," are ignoring détente and are creating artificial obstacles of distrust. L. I. Brezhnev commented during his visit to the FRG (4-7 May 1978) that "there are opponents of détente in the West, including your country (that is,

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the FRG -- N. G.)." L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that they hold that "fears of and hostility toward the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries should always be present in their countries' policy, even if this increases the risk of another war."<sup>6</sup>

Former Defense Minister Strauss, long-standing claimant to the position of chancellor, is a typical "opponent of détente." Following the signing of the treaty with the Soviet Union and Poland, he and his supporters began particularly aggressively calling for a crusade against communism. Other representatives, primarily of industrial circles, have been drawn, frequently against their will, into the complex process of painful reassessment of the formulas of the "Adenauer era." Still others are taking their first steps along the path of realism, while others are increasingly more insistently demanding development of good relations with that vast world which begins at the eastern boundaries of the Federal Republic.

Political battle reached a fever pitch in connection with ratification of the treaty between the FRG, the USSR and Poland. CDU leaders called the policy of Chancellor W. Brandt practically a "policy of surrender." Reactionaries are still refusing to lay down their arms. The danger of rightist extremism is a serious problem for political affairs in the FRG today. Latter-day saviors of the "Fatherland" in the persons of Strauss and Tadden are alarmed by realistic tendencies in the FRG's foreign policy since the SPD-FDP coalition government came into power. For two decades the CDU and CSU stood at the helm of the Bonn state. Their negative, one-sided policy led the country to an impasse. Defeat in the 1969 parliamentary elections was a logical consequence of the fact that their policy failed to meet the demands of life. Today they are dissatisfied with the new "eastern policy," in particular the Soviet-West German treaty, in signing which the government of the FRG "took a truly bold step from the trenches of cold war." Nor do they like the Polish-West German treaty.

Vigorous, purposeful diplomatic activity by the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community, as well as their joint efforts on behalf of European peace and good-neighbor relations have greatly changed Europe's international politics. Such events of prime importance as the treaties between the USSR and FRG, Poland and the FRG, signed a quarter of a century after war's end, constitute indicators of the scope and significance of important changes for the better on the European continent. New evidence of this was offered by the 17 months of talks between the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France, which began at Soviet initiative and ended with the signing on 3 September 1971 of a four-party agreement on West Berlin. Of particular importance for averting conflicts and strengthening security in Europe is the fact that for the first time the three Western powers signed a binding international legal document which states that West Berlin is not a component part of the FRG and cannot be governed by the FRG. This is in conformity with the international legal realities to which the Soviet Union and the GDR had always adhered.

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As regards the rebirth of militarism in the FRG and its transformation into a shock force of NATO, the Soviet Union's firm and consistent position has compelled the governments of the Western powers from time to time to postpone implementation of their plans and to seek roundabout ways to execute them. If it were not for the policy of the Soviet Union on the German question, the militarization of the Federal Republic of Germany would have been carried out sooner and on an even broader scale.<sup>7</sup>

Certain NATO circles are continuing to spread ridiculous fabrications about "aggressive intentions" on the part of the socialist countries, while at the same time under the smokescreen of a "Soviet threat," they are signing agreements on competence and cooperation between NATO and Bundeswehr commanders "in case of military operations." All this is taking place at the same time as talks are being held in Vienna on reduction of forces and arms in Central Europe. And the reason for the fact that desired progress has not yet been achieved at the Vienna talks lies primarily in the fact that the Western countries are seeking one-sided military advantages for the NATO countries.

Standing in opposition to the aggressive plans of the militarists from the FRG and NATO is a firm and purposeful policy of peaceful coexistence and cessation of the arms race which is being persistently and consistently pursued by the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community. In our time -- a time of great success for the forces of peace and progress, major achievements in the development of science and technology -- the demand for an end to the arms race and resolution of the problems of universal and total disarmament is being advanced to the forefront.

Serious concern is aroused by the fact that, in spite of positive changes which are taking place in the international situation, material preparations for war and buildup of armaments are not ending. "We are convinced," noted L. I. Brezhnev in a message to the participants in the international symposium on disarmament in 1975, "that the arms race is not fatally inevitable."<sup>8</sup> "And if I were asked today," continues L. I. Brezhnev in his book "Malaya zemlya" [Little Land], "what would be the main conclusion I would draw, having been through the war from the first to the last day, I would reply: it should never be repeated. There should never again be war."<sup>9</sup>

FOOTNOTES

1. "Weissbuch 1971/1972" [1971/1972 White Book], page 6.
2. "Vizit Leonida Il'icha Brezhneva v Federativnyuyu Respubliku Germanii, 4-7 maya 1978 goda" [Visit by Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev to the Federal Republic of Germany, 4-7 May 1978], Moscow, 1978, page 38.
3. Ibid., page 11.
4. "Misstrauische Nachbar. Deutsche Ostpolitik 1919/1970" [Suspicious Neighbors. German Eastern Policy, 1919/1970], Düsseldorf, 1970, page 27.

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5. "Nach 25 Jahren. Eine Deutschland-Bilanz" [After 25 Years. A Balance Sheet for Germany], Munich, 1970, page 10.
6. "Vizit...", op. cit., page 26.
7. See "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR, 1945-1976" [History of USSR Foreign Policy, 1945-1976], Moscow, 1977. page 206.
8. Brezhnev, L. I. "leninskim kursom" [Following a Leninist Course], Vol 5, page 328.
9. Brezhnev, L. I. "Malaya zemlya" [Little Land], Moscow, 1978, page 48.

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FRANCE

BRIEFS

RESEARCH SPENDING COMPARED--The CNPF [National Council of French Businessmen] is alarmed; for every 40 francs French industry is spending on research, the FRG is spending 75 and the Japanese 90. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 28 Sep 79 p 45]

PCF GAINING GROUND--The PCF is gaining ground at the expense of the socialists in one of every five departments, according to recent reports by [departmental] prefects. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 28 Sep 79 p 45]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

DIPLOMATIC REORGANIZATION IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY VIEWED

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 27 Sep 79 p 15 LD

[Article by Corrado Incerti: "Two Malfattis' Foreign Ministry Blitz"]

[Text] Never in living memory had the ghostly parallelepiped of the Farnesina, which Achille Starace designed as the Ministry of the Fasces and Corporations and which Amintore Fanfani transformed into the Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seen so many top officials hard at work in mid-August. With Rome deserted, Italy's attention elsewhere and the politicians on vacation, Secretary General Francesco Malfatti de Montetrotto decided, with his homonymous minister's blessing, to prepare plans for a timely "revolution": Under his iron directives (Farnesina officials call him "Panzer") secretariat staff were compiling a meaty white paper on the (desperate) state of Italian diplomacy, on the criteria to be followed for its regeneration and on the new names suitable to replace dozens and dozens of diplomats either already retired or on the way to retirement.

With a rapidity with an element of the miraculous in a ministry which Rumor, Moro and Forlani kept immobile and bureaucratic, the white paper came to light. The revolution is underway. At the end of August a young secretariat official delivered the white paper to Minister Franco Maria Malfatti, vacationing in Elba, who returned it the next morning, approved in toto. In an entirely unprecedented move, President of the Republic Sandro Pertini accepted the administration's organizational plan without trying to insert any politico-favoritist elements: For the past 30 years this has been the rule. In the year of grace 1979 the Farnesina entered the modern world.

The approval of the white paper's organizational plan was as rapid as its compilation. On Tuesday 4 September the Council of Ministers launched the new Foreign Ministry general staff, promoted 11 diplomats to the rank of ambassador, 13 to minister first class and 33 to minister second class. The majority of those promoted have had experience with the EEC: In the future this will be regarded almost as a precondition as Italy's foreign policy becomes increasingly integrated with the EEC.

So the Farnesina is structurally entering Europe. Even its chief of general staff, Maurizio Bucci, the new director general for economic affairs,

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has lived in Brussels for almost 20 years. He entered diplomacy after the war (the era of the bureaucratic dinosaurs is truly past) as did his deputy, Giacomo Attolico, appointed minister first class, who is responsible for organizing credit to other countries and is chairman of the very important arms committee. A great deal of space has been cleared for young men: Since from 1940 through 1948 entrance examinations were suspended, it is now men in their forties who must occupy our top diplomatic posts. An outright revolution. Renato Ruggiero, head of the minister's personal staff, who was also appointed minister first class, is 49 and faces an unprecedented future in the history of our diplomatic staff: Because of 10 years' experience in Brussels (as EEC Chairman Malfatti's chief of personal staff) it is very likely that in a year's time, at the end of Italy's 6-month term of chairmanship, during which Eugenio Plaja, who is about to retire, will remain in office, he will become ambassador to the EEC.

On Friday 14 September the second phase in the Farnesina revolution took place: The first ambassadors in certain important locations were appointed. This is a "test run": In a year's time almost 20 embassies should have new ambassadors. If the government and the state administration digest the new criteria it will be possible to proceed. The criteria are as follows: Abolition of the principle that one can only reach the top after the age of 60; selective promotion on merit and no longer on the basis of length of service; specialization, with special attention to the EEC, the Mediterranean and economic issues (we will have to survive through our exports during this period of recession); an experiment in multilateral negotiations (an autonomous foreign policy is no longer feasible for Italy); rapid promotion for personnel working in "hardship" posts; knowledge of the host country's language (this seems obvious, but a considerable number of our diplomats do not know the local language). The very role of the embassy will have to be changed: It will no longer be a center exclusively for bilateral or worldwide policy but an office for analyzing data to be submitted swiftly to the various central directorates (specially the economic directorate).

The second stage in the regeneration was therefore prompted by the new criteria. Here are two examples: Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, personnel director and former chairman of the independent internal trade union, who will be appointed the new ambassador to Bonn immediately after Pertini's visit to Germany, is "young," an expert in multilateral negotiations (he was a skilfull negotiator in Helsinki), knows German and is an expert in East-West problems. He is an expert, like Andrea Cangiati, the new ambassador to London, who has solid British experience behind him and who took part in the MBFR talks in Vienna. The other appointments in the second stage observe the same criteria. Here are the names concerned: Iacoangeli to Brasilia, Boris Biancheri to Tokyo, Quaroni to Tripoli, Giuffrida to Cairo, Tornetta to NATO and Farinelli to Tunis.

The third stage will be the most traumatic. Some predictions can be made, but everything depends on the government's reaction to the two Malfattis'

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summer revolution. So far there has only been one case of endemic filial affection (Saragat would like to see his son Giovannino appointed ambassador to a major post) and one of attachment to an acquired family relation (Bernabei would like more rapid promotion for his son-in-law Valenza, a counsellor in Paris), but we await the reaction of the state administration, which always acts as a brake on innovative currents. The only guarantee against interference has come precisely from the Farnesina administration, which the regeneration has shaken from its old apathy and which now seems to have discovered its own dignity and independence.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PCI, PSI OFFICIALS DISCUSS PROSPECTS FOR LEFT ALLIANCE

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 27 Sep 79 pp 12-13 LD

[L'EUROPEO roundtable discussion with PCI Secretariat member Emanuele Macaluso and Italian Socialist Party (PSI) Directorate member Claudio Martelli: "For Goodness' Sake Comrade Let Us Not Quarrel"]

[Excerpt] A PCI and a PSI which, though without abandoning the ideological debate and their differing political outlooks, can nevertheless find certain specific points of convergence on which to exert pressure on the Christian Democratic Party [DC]. This is the picture of relations within the Italian left as they emerged from the 20 September meeting between Bettino Craxi and Enrico Berlinguer. PSI Directorate member Claudio Martelli and PCI Directorate member Emanuele Macaluso discussed this with L'EUROPEO.

L'EUROPEO: Since 1921 the unity policy has never brought the leftwing forces into the government and is now becoming a myth.

Macaluso: This is not true. When communists and socialists have been united they have influenced the political situation. You only have to recall the agreement on united action on immigration, which was a reference point for the liberation war until the conquest of the republic. Unity was essential during the De Gasperi and Scelba period. Even now that there are different and sometimes divergent roads, cooperation between communists and socialists in the municipal administrations, the trade union movement and the cooperative movement is not only important but characterizes the Italian situation with respect to other countries. Nevertheless, it is true that the left has not had a chance to present itself as a government force.

Martelli: Unity is not always the best thing. In certain circumstances it can have paralyzing and negative effects, as the history of our parties shows. That is not the point. The point is that we must not make the issue of unity prevail over that of clarity in relations within the left: And this is not in order to set back the prospect of unity but possibly to make it a winning one. Specifically on what outlook could an agreement now be established between the two major leftwing parties? It could not

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be a popular front or a historical compromise. I would agree unreservedly if unity were created around a laborite-type outlook. But in his RINASCITA article Berlinguer says that there must be a "revolution in the West." If this is anything other than an international experience, what is it? In any case it is both parties' duty to find a point of mediation which takes into account above all the need to reduce DC hegemony and to resolve some of the country's major problems through joint initiatives.

Macaluso: I would like to explain right away that revolution in the West means a transformation of society with democratic means in the direction of socialism. This is our option. Berlinguer proceeds from an analysis of the demands to transform society, which require a greater convergence among the forces wanting change--the communists, socialists and Catholic and DEC forces. The reactions which have occurred, even in the socialist camp, seem to me to prove that these are real demands.

Martelli: Berlinguer's article is not dedicated to the socialists but to the DEC. The PSI is regarded as a lateral element in the compromise strategy. It would be of no importance whether our role is a leading or a subordinate one if the strategy were a good one. The problem is not the means but the end. What kind of socialism do we want to achieve in Italy? If one acknowledges Soviet society as socialist--as Berlinguer did recently in the final communique on his meeting with Brezhnev--then it is legitimate to suspect that one wishes to propose Soviet-style socialism, albeit mellowed, for Italy.

Macaluso: That is not true. We have been saying for a long time that we want a pluralist society and certain forms of private initiative, that is, a very different form of socialism from that which exists in the eastern bloc countries or in China. You mention the joint communique with the Soviets but it does not mean that we will not sign one with the Chinese as well, since even at the harshest moments in the Moscow-Beijing polemic we have never denied that Chinese society is socialist. In any case it seems to me that there is a degree of provincialism in the examination of our relations with the CPSU. Brezhnev has also met with Mitterrand and their communique contained a similar acknowledgement of the USSR by the French socialists.

Martelli: It did not say the same thing.

Macaluso: Read the communique again. In any case a CPSU representative attended the French Socialist Party congress.

Martelli: They refused to attend our congress, however, because we were responsible for the Venice Biennale exhibition on dissidence. The grave point about the Berlinguer-Brezhnev communique is not merely that it acknowledges Soviet society without even mentioning illiberal aspects, as Berlinguer did in 1977 (this is a frightening retreat), but that it contains a commitment to forming a joint front against "anti-Soviet campaigns."

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What is the target? Dissidence. And who has supported dissidence? The PSI. Moreover, the communique greets the USSR's successes in various fields and omits to mention the military field, where the successes are most evident and that the Warsaw Pact's strategic superiority has grown so much, at least in Europe, that it has forced NATO to undertake a difficult pursuit.

L'EUROPEO: When socialists and communists stand together they lose votes. When they stand divided, however, they are in fact manipulated by the DC.

Macaluso: There is a basis of truth in this observation. This is the reason for our reservations regarding the socialist alternative and our opposition to the center-left. Even our own experience of the past 3 years of "national unity" did not achieve the results we were aiming at. So the question still facing the PCI and the PSI is this: What is the point of agreement between the two parties on which to exert the most influence on the DC and on the transformation of society?

Martelli: In my opinion it is much more consistent with reality and with political possibilities to talk in terms of a leftwing alliance rather than unity. One point of disagreement is the model which we propose for the country. The PCI values historical continuity more than the PSI. This is why, when discussing Lenin and Proudhon, we raised the issue of the ideological debate, which must not, however, be merely a summer storm. How can one guarantee a securely democratic outcome to the revolution in the West if the Leninist residue is not dealt with first? We are not asking for abjurations because we would not make any either; but what we do want are unequivocal verdicts. As for political hypotheses, it would be a great mistake, a terrible tragedy, if the largest western Communist Party pursued a base form of competition with the smallest western Socialist Party in a quest for special relations with the DC and vice versa. This is why we attach so much importance to the debate between communists and socialists. Unless we clarify matters properly among ourselves, the inevitable outcome threatens to be a split. Our aim is not a socialist premiership, a split or a clash within the left. We would be satisfied if you demonstrated toward the left the same attitude as you did toward Andreotti's premiership.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PRI SECRETARY CITED ON CRISIS, COSSIGA GOVERNMENT

Interview With PRI Secretary

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 26 Sep 79 p 2 LD

[Undated interview in Turin with Italian Republican Party Secretary Giovanni Spadolini by Giuseppe Sangiorgio: "New Political and Social Pact Against the Crisis"]

[Excerpt] Turin [Question] Faced with such a dangerous situation (as regards public order, the economy and so forth), in your opinion can the government last long? Or will it need to be given new blood?

[Answer] This government had a bad start, lacking any specific policy connotation and in a state of emergency which we acknowledged--precisely as Republicans--through our abstention. It is not a coalition government, but it is not a single-party government either. The parties which took part in its formation are quarreling on decisive points of policy: I am referring, for instance, to pensions. And it is not clear what approach has been decided on for energy. The attitude adopted toward the unions and index linkage has seemed uncertain and contradictory to us. Though a minority government, the Cossiga government still needs a political synthesis. We see no sign of this, despite our good will.

[Question] Do you really believe that nothing happened at the Craxi-Berlinguer meeting, as some people maintain?

[Answer] I regard it as simplistic and somewhat hypocritical to say that nothing happened. I can understand Zanone's embarrassment after he based his entire policy on an explicitly anticommunist, socialist-led five-party arrangement. The Italian Liberal Party secretary now prefers to skirt the obstacle. But the problem does exist. Craxi has reminded all those inclined to forget it that the Italian Socialist Party is allied to the communists in all the major local administrations, in trade union life and in the factories; it has made a commitment to renew those alliances in the municipal and regional administrations for the post-June 1980 period.

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Is this a pressure weapon on the Christian Democratic Party for creating a socialist premiership from it in the spring? Or a return to a closer leftwing tactical understanding, albeit in the underground struggle for hegemony within the workers movement which has never ceased since the 1921 Livorno split, but in which the socialists have never prevailed except in 1946? That is a difficult question to answer at present. But certainly there are no easy solutions close to hand. Everything would be so easy if Italy's problems--so tragic and disruptive--could indeed be resolved by means of a center-left differing from the one 10 years ago in comprising five parties, including the liberals, instead of four.

PLI Secretary's Reply

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 27 Sep 79 p 2 LD

[F. M. 26 September interview in Rome with Italian Liberal Party (PLI) Secretary Valerio Zanone: "Zanone Replies to Spadolini: Five-Party Agreement Only Solution for Stable Government"]

[Excerpt] Rome--"Contrary to what Senator Spadolini imagines," the PLI secretary said, "the Berlinguer-Craxi meeting does not embarrass me at all. If the alliances between socialists and communists continue in local government, the liberals will continue to oppose leftwing councils and majorities, which in several important cases have enjoyed the Italian Republican party's backing."

[Question] What if the PCI-Italian Socialist Party [PSI] meeting really led to a government with the communists?

[Answer] If the communist-socialist talks really led to the formation of a government with the PCI (though so far it is legitimate to doubt it), the Liberals would--as the PLI directorate unanimously confirmed 2 days ago--oppose such a compromise which, however, the Republicans recently judged ineluctable.

[Question] Do you believe that the Craxi-Berlinguer meeting has resolved the dispute between the parties?

[Answer] I have already stressed more than once a point which I regard as essential: The profound divergence which exists between the PCI and the Western democratic parties on foreign policy lines. This divergence has become greatly accentuated since the recent PCI-CPSU meeting in Moscow. Even the PSI daily AVANTI!, commenting on the Craxi-Berlinguer meeting, admitted that the dialog between the parties on the foreign policy issue will have to be clarified and examined in greater depth. In short, the essential arguments against a coalition between the Western democratic parties and the PCI remain. Unless the aim is to relapse into the contradictory agreements which we witnessed in 1978 and which had unsuccessful outcomes, including the early dissolution of Parliament.

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[Question] So you still believe that the solution to the current problems is a five-party government with the PCI in opposition?

[Answer] Italy's problems cannot be resolved merely by means of a political formula: To tackle them we need an efficient government, and to form an efficient government we need a stability based on an adequately like-minded coalition. I can only see one possibility for this legislative period: The five-way coalition (the "socialist leadership" is an addition by Spadolini) which until yesterday had the PRI's declared backing as well.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PROPOSED REFORM OF PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Reasons For Permanent Political Crisis

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 21 Jul 79 p 2

[Article by Luciano Pellicani: "Why the Political System Runs the Risk of Finding Itself in a Permanent Crisis--The Parties and the Ungovernability of the Country"]

[Text] It is now clear to everyone that the Italian system is an anomalous political system, even to those who until just a few months ago depicted it as the first example of a new and superior form of democracy. Its rate of entropy and therefore its ungovernability grew from one legislative session to the next. Early elections were held three times to stop this process of involution. But this expedient each time proved ineffective. Counting votes every so often brings us to a deadend street and that can be useful only under one condition: That a homogeneous government majority emerges from the urns. This is impossible as we found out in an election system that promotes the scattering of votes, such as the one we have now. What we would need actually is a carefully considered effort aimed at election devices so as to make them less expressive and more instrumental. The only trouble is that most of the parties look upon this with horror. Some do so because they are afraid of being wiped out; others are doing so because they think that their blackmail power might be drastically reduced. The result of this obstinate refusal to resort to institutional engineering in order to improve the output of the political system is plain for anyone to see: The progressive paralysis of the decision-making process.

But it would be wrong for anybody to think that the system's ungovernability springs from a simple lack of effectiveness. It is indeed true that Italy's political class is rather poorly equipped to run a modern industrial society. But the matrix of the Italian anomaly is elsewhere and resides precisely in the lack of legitimacy from which the republic's institutions suffer.

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The analytical model that would, better than any other, explain the very special syntactical logic which for more than 30 years governed the operations of the republic, in my opinion, is the one drafted by Giovanni Sartori and baptized "polarized pluralism." The essence of polarized pluralism is the existence of a major ideological distance between the poles around which the various political formations revolve. This means that there are profound disagreements among the political actors concerning the "just society" and that these disagreements make it impossible to arrive at an accord on the procedural rules governing the fight for the conquest and management of power.

This absence of consensus on the rules of the game produces a profound disturbance in the system's operation. As a matter of fact, rotation in power ceases to be a credible expectation since it would imply a change in the regime itself, much more so than a simple change in the men running the government. This means that the electorate is not being called upon to decide which minority is to have control of the levers of government but rather to express itself on the existing institutional setup. Under polarized pluralism--which substantially is a "democracy under siege" by subversive or delegitimizing forces--elections are not choices of men and government programs but rather real and proper referendums on the system.

In the light of Sartori's model, we can easily understand why the DC [Christian Democratic Party] became the irremovable party in power. It got the benefit of a parasitary surrender. As for the "anticommunist dam," it was regularly rewarded also when its management of public affairs turned out to be inefficient and corrupt. We can furthermore understand why the left in Italy has never been able to present itself as an alternative to Christian-Democratic power. As a matter of fact, with respect to its majority component--the PCI [Italian Communist Party]--we witnessed that preventive discrimination which Leopoldo Elia referred to as "conventio ad excludendum" [an agreement to keep somebody out].

To make the political picture even more anomalous we have in recent years arrived at the fact that a kind of "sharecropper-style hegemony" developed between the DC and the PCI. The two superparties were able to win a (quasi) monopoly of electoral representation; but, given the ideological distance that separated them (and still separates them), they were unable to develop their collaboration beyond a certain limit. And when the association broke up, the country suddenly found itself like a ship without a rudder.

Failure to understand that the compromise with the "Christian Party" had no chance of becoming "historical" very probably was the most serious error of judgement made by the communist leaders--an error that nourished illusory expectations among the rank and file and that made the election defeat even more stinging. To achieve the elimination of the clause that barred them from the government of the republic, they should have carried

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ideological revision to its logical conclusion, that is to say, they should have social-democratized their party or, which boils down to the same thing, they should have thrown out the so-called "K-factor." But this is precisely what they did not want to do (or were unable to do). They believed that it was possible to get into the headquarters of government itself without breaking their organic links with Soviet totalitarianism. And the electorate dryly black-balled that bizarre undertaking.

At the same time however it did not unequivocally indicate a formula to replace the historical compromise. Hence, the unique situation which was created and which is unprecedented in the republic's history, a situation which now entails the risk of moving us from polarized pluralism to "paralyzed pluralism."

This is certainly not a happy conclusion. But it cannot help anybody to conceal the true nature of the ill which surrounds and corrodes the vital fabric of the republic. A correct diagnosis therefore is the indispensable premise for the right kind of therapy.

#### Reconciling Democracy, Presidential Republic

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 10 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Salvatore Sechi: "Debate on Political Crisis of Parliamentary System"]

[Text] In the debate on the Italian government system and on the prospects for the reform of the parliamentary system, opened in CORRIERE in an article by the socialist ideolog Luciano Pellicani (21 July), there is now a new participant in the person of the communist intellectual Salvatore Sechi. A teacher of contemporary history, a leader of the worker current in the PCI, Sechi gained fame in particular for having thoroughly criticized his party's "democratic centralism."

The Italian social crisis (whose breadth the PCI was practically the only to denounce) is being examined contextually in the light of the acuteness of the institutional crisis. The recent events concerning the formation of the current cabinet constitutes further and worrisome proof of this. Without a stable majority and a strong, authoritative executive, the chambers will not function (this is the thesis of Pietro Ingrao); but that is not all; the conflicts of interest and "diffuse" and complex social demands (which therefore are less and less filterable by the party apparatuses) could be tried in an attempt to seek a response to an extra institutional and subversive solution. From Roosevelt-style leader democracy we might plunge into a pure and simple Hitler-style leader principle, that is to say, into undemocratic "decisionism."

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DC chairman Flaminio Piccoli even before 3 June called for a reform of the election law based on the "majority bonus." Its limitations are not to be found, as has been said, in the unconstitutionality of the idea or in the attack on political pluralism; instead it resides, on the one hand, in the condemnation of the minor parties to a mostly subordinate role and, on the other hand, in the refusal to tackle the more general problems of operating the political system as such, in other words, from the role of the parties to the form of government. The topic we have to discuss first of all is the topic of constitutional discipline by the parties themselves. Public control over financing, reliable guarantees on internal democracy, strict definition of political-parliamentary functions which they should exclusively perform--all of this means striking a death blow at the system of dividing the spoils and of the molecular occupation of society on which almost all parties thrive.

From a formal viewpoint, I do not know of anything more efficient (although with the limitations illustrated by W. Abendroth) than the model of the Fundamental Law in force in the FRG. As far as public financing is concerned, we could have a model along the lines tried out in Puerto Rico (equal contributions for all parties, even small ones, regardless of whether or not they have any seats in parliament).

In third place, Piccoli and his party friends are not establishing any correlation between institutional surgery and political and social strategy. Consequently, their objective seems to be to hold on to the masses, the workers (those who are suffering the consequences of entropy and of the correlative nongovernment of the country), far from the crucial topic which instead they would be enveloped by in the first person: The government of the institution of a country with mature capitalism.

The left cannot confine itself to rending its clothing, denouncing the political initiative of the DC as a drive for hegemony with reactionary overtones. The PCI and the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] are forced by the election results to find solutions different not only from an impossible collaboration with a government that is run under central control by the Christian Democrats but also a government with Christian Democratic participation. Having failed to do so in the course of the elections, the left therefore must find ways to express an institutional alternative of its own: Giving the country a new form of government which will enable the executive to function in a stable fashion and which will enable parliament to control and orient the executive's actions.

The PCI is doing well in defending (but not in identifying) the proportional system as an insurance policy for pluralism. But some corrections are absolutely indispensable. I am talking here about the need for abolishing the hidden majority bonus which violates the principle of equality of votes (a liberal deputy, as Ronchey recalled, is worth twice as much as a communist). In second place, there is announced here a referendum to explore the existence of popular consensus for the abolition of that useless and

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expensive duplication of the Chamber which of course if the Senate. For a country tired of "political professionalism," dividing the parliamentary "pie" would be something that Gramsci would call a most powerful "tonic" for restoring confidence in the institutions. The PCI should take the initiative here. During the Constituent Assembly it was as a matter of fact a tough (and, in terms of the alliances, an unbiased) defender of the unicameral system. At the congress, Enrico Berlinguer did take up the problem but nobody picked it up thereafter.

Giuliano Amato recently proposed to upgrade the Senate as a Chamber of the Regions. But it does not seem to me that he took into account one strong counterindication: We would in effect be opposing one branch of parliament, elected on the basis of nationwide political lineups (the Chamber) with another branch (the Senate, precisely), which would be reduced to becoming an expression of local (regional) interests.

In third place it is indispensable for us to study an election mechanism which would enable us to combine the "national vocation" of the major parties with the inevitable municipalistic thrusts and the corporative and sector interests often tied to the preferential vote. Why not elect the Chamber on the basis of the mixed electoral system (but without the 5-percent jugular clause) in force in Germany? This would mean that 50 percent of the deputies would be elected under the proportional system for a single national body, thus guaranteeing enough room for pluralism. The other 50 percent would have to be elected under the majority system (closed slate without preferential votes). In this way, the will of the voters could prevail over the will of the local bosses and the party and election machinery, furthermore preventing the fine-spray fragmentation of the current lineup in favor of coalition.

But the toughest problem to face for the left is another one: The problem of the form of government. This involves dropping the high costs of the parliamentary system for the greater benefit of the presidential system. I believe as a matter of fact that having the communists join the administration would not decrease but would rather increase (precisely because of the greater strictness of our transformation program) the centrifugal tensions and thrusts within the majority. The past three years are proof of that.

The basic premise of parliamentary government is the existence of a homogeneous majority or the possibility of putting it together. On it depends the stability of the cabinet. The English experience is emblematic in this respect; there, Parliament is at the mercy of the government over whose direction and control it has limited powers.

When (and this has been the case in Italy for too many years) no party manages to win a majority by itself and when we go ahead with scarcely homogeneous coalition governments, then we run into a case which is the exact opposite of the English case: The weak executive is subordinated to

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the (very strong) actions of the parliamentary assembly. If they are then divided, the government is subjected to permanent blackmail from any of the parties in the coalition. This is why it lives from day to day, from compromises, delays, decree-laws, very often getting only compensatory scraps and micro-privileges.

This is why, as Piero Calamandrei replied to Togliatti and Amendola during the debate in the Constituent Assembly on 15 September 1946, the government's stability and endurance may find a positive and adequate response only in a republic or in a presidential system of government. "If the three-party system is to go on for a little while yet," said Calamandrei, "do you believe that one could continue to govern Italy with a parliamentary government structure, such as the one proposed in the constitution draft?" And he concluded: "If it is to work, democracy must have a stable government: That is the fundamental problem of democracy. If a democratic system does not manage to put together a government that will really govern, then it is doomed."

In some editorials in L'UNITA prior to the elections, Luigi Berlinguer objected that the presidential system would be a form of oligarchic, authoritarian government incompatible with a socialist transformation of the country. Well and good. I see no better antidote against the Caesarist and plebiscitary assumptions than that of a proper election of the national representative assembly and the head of state, with equally long terms of office, as well as a close connection between the program on which the parliamentary majority is elected and the program of the president. The latter would only be the guarantor and executor of the program accord among the forces that elected him. His legitimation in terms of governing does not depend on the confidence of the latter. The two bodies are not superposed because, since they do not have the power to promote the crisis, they are at the same time renewed. The fact that they have equal sources of power (direct elections) gives them an autonomy of their own and they balance each other out. Dissent would no longer be lacerating and would not paralyze the mechanisms of the decision-making process, as happens now between the administration and the parliament.

It is odd that this explicit politicization of the presidential function should be denied in Italy by the left in the name of a mystical interpretation of the "guaranteeism," the neutrality, and the independence of the head of state. But we have sufficient historical, legal, and political literature which, from Esposito to Riva, from Rodota to Rescigno, etc., recognizes something which everybody has been aware of for at least twenty years: In Italy we have a presidential system which is cringing rather than hidden. If it has so far given sanction and legitimacy to the equilibriums and force ratios of the executive (the DC), this is not a good reason for entertaining illusions on its impartiality.

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Its enormous powers today as always become evident in the presence of bitter breaks between the political forces and in the face of an absence of decisions: Either on the part of a government that does not govern or on the part of a political majority without homogeneity or, worse, a political majority that does not exist.

I frankly do not believe that the problem is the problem of a "democracy under siege" due to the fact of the failed "Labouritization" of the PCI and "its organic link with Soviet totalitarianism," as Pellicani thinks. It seems to me instead that the problem of changing the way in which policy is made, the problem of the analysis of the crisis, of the concept of work and power, cuts straight across the social bloc of the PCI, the PSI, the DC itself, and the "New Left." While this push does not always (as a matter of fact, rather rarely) manage to involve the leaders and the conservative culture of what I have called the "apparatus bourgeoisie," it is however also true that, inside these parties, there is a group of intellectuals, of labor unionists, and also of politicians, a group that is quite anomalous with respect to the national-popular, historical, and other traditions of the respective organizations. It is up to them first of all to go into a debate and to come up with a proposal for an institutional reform, apart from coming up with a new social strategy. The objective however must not be to have it operate like a kind of "council of princes," but rather to build a blueprint or a new political system by gathering and mobilizing the push toward change which is present in the masses. The social and institutional crisis can be unloaded on them as a moderate, authoritarian revenge or it can be the spark for a grand initiative of change in the form of politics.

Drive To Abolish Senate

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 7 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Salvatore Sechi: "Proposal to the Left-Wing Forces: Launch Campaign to Abolish Senate"]

[Text] The debate on the institutional reform, opened in recent weeks by CORRIERE and revived in recent days by Zaccagnini in the report to the National Council of the DC, today presents an article by the communist historian Salvatore Sechi.

Because of its short political life expectancy, the Cossiga cabinet will have to come to grips with the problem of the effectiveness, timeliness, and productivity of its decisions. In coordinating their initiatives aimed at controlling inflation, it is especially the "technical" ministers (such as Andreatta, Giannini, Lombardini, Reviglio, etc.) who will right away warn us that the paralysis of the Italian political system is somehow independent of the crisis of the economic system and even influences it.

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Hence the need for a stable and authoritative executive branch. This is also necessary to guarantee parliament the possibility of playing its central role as a body concerned with the control and direction of government management. From that viewpoint it would seem to be a good idea that the government--without taking anything away from the parties (which are the instruments of civil society but which fortunately are not yet the governing bodies of that society)--tackle an institutional reform which is now due: The abolition of a venerated "useless body" such as the Senate.

This is not a matter of making a dispute worse by giving that constitutional body subjective responsibilities (passive collaboration, obstructionism, etc.); what counts here is that it must, even from on high, help make evident (by documenting it whenever the opportunity arises), that the origin of the country's growing social malaise resides in inadequate institutional organization itself.

In these columns (10 August) I stressed the need for putting an end to the luxury of the bicameral system. It is worth the effort to resume the discourse in greater detail.

Apart from the differentiation relative to the age limit of the voters and the number of members (18 years for the 630 in the Chamber and 25 for the 315 members of the Senate), the equality of the representative structure, of the procedures, of the powers, of the term of office, etc., turns Italy's two elective assemblies into a paritary bicameral system. That system is more "braking" rather than "guaranteeist." It is a rather rare model in the constitutional geography. It is thus an exceptional thing (that is to say, a waste of resources), with a large number of members of parliament, with mostly microlegislative power given to the commissions, with the longevity of the political class (very similar to the biblical one of Melchisedech), etc.

Giuliano Amato and, recently, Gambino already demonstrated that no country with a liberal democracy has a bicameral system as useless, in overall terms, as the one we have in Italy. The PCI's joining the majority also did away with the reasons that politically justified the existence of the two chambers. I am talking here about the possibility offered to the opposition to hold the administration's [cabinet] in check by utilizing the two parliamentary tribunes to address public opinion. Instead, the DC is offered the possibility of absorbing, in the Senate, the defection of its own Robin Hoods (the snipers) which happened in the Chamber. The same function of decongestion and improvement of the legislative process can be performed by a single assembly with a different relationship between the body as a whole and the committee. Nor does it seem to me that, without planning the entire parliamentary effort and without the advance arrangement of a plan for the development of the economy, one could solve the problem of establishing links between the regions and the central government agencies.

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The abolition of the Senate is in line with the following exigencies.

1. Reducing the time required for translating the political demand coming from the country into legislative solution. Today, that political demand is being exercised with recourse to a flood of decree-laws which have become a regular instrument of legislative policy. It is therefore paradoxical (but not so much so any longer) that a residue of "reverential fear" toward the constitution and the tendency toward the self-defense of a real and proper stratum of professional politicians, should not identify the Senate as the body on which depends (certainly not in an exclusive manner) the extension of the time required for the passage of laws. This result implies the duplication of operations, of procedures, and of "theatrical histrionics" (denounced by Alessandro Natta).
2. Reducing the by now pathological tendency toward the parliamentarization of politics and of the parties. Italy has 945 people's representatives (the largest number in the world), as compared to 535 in the United States. In relation to the number of inhabitants, this means one for every 57,000 as against one for every 390,000 in the United States, one for every 145,000 in Japan, one for every 110,000 in West Germany, one for every 85,000 in France, etc. The consequence is that the passage of laws that are of some substance and significance on the average takes 322 days (for further data I would like to refer the reader to the excellent research job done four years ago by a team directed by Alberto Predieri).
3. Contain (reversing it is practically impossible) the process which has shifted the standard-creating power outside parliament (by spreading it around to the regions, labor unions, pressure groups, etc.). The elective national assemblies are reduced to bodies that are concerned with the mere notarial registration of agreements (and possibly disagreements) that were shaped up outside. The phenomenon is macroscopic (but Italy is no exception here) to the extent that it involves the management of the economy, the security services, and the military establishment for example connected with NATO, etc.
4. Realize that the "crystallized crack" (as Ingrao called it) created between the DC and the PCI after 1947 no longer exists. For at least 20 years, most of the laws have been passed by a legislative majority different from the government majority, that is to say, with the consensus and the help of the opposition. This is why the historical "guaranteeist" function of the Senate no longer has any reason for existence.
5. Deprive the government of the power to play the bicameral card on the basis of a principle of mere political discretionality. It did so generally in two ways. Either by, from time to time, selecting as its conversation partner the "safest" assembly for its own policy (in general, the Senate where the radicals, to give an example, were not present) or to prevent heavily innovative laws from getting anywhere (or making them get to us in a profoundly demanded fashion). Control of public opinion became more difficult in this fashion and it promoted sectionalism and the fragmentation of government activities; besides, budget management was distorted.

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As Lucio Libertini revealed in an excellent "people's essay" ("Quale parlamento?" [What parliament?], Einaudi, 1977), "this type of bicameral system as a matter of fact is not useless from a certain specific viewpoint; it is, as a matter of fact, a system which is constantly slowed down and which increases the paralysis of the government system as a whole." And he concludes rather significantly: "While it is possible to figure out measures which would reduce the damage done by the bicameral system, any attempt at bringing about an organizational solution evidently brings us back to the conclusion that a single chamber would be enough." I have quoted here the opinion of a communist leader (and I could also make reference to Barbera, Baldassarre, Natta, Terracini, etc.) to show why the PCI (and the PSI) fought for the single-chamber system during the Constituent Assembly. A return to that position was hinted at during the last congress by Enrico Berlinguer and this is also at the very heart of the project and debate now underway in the PSI.

Why should discussion and political initiative among the left find it so difficult to get together and to grow through each other? For three reasons, I believe. On the one hand, there is an old prejudice, the prejudice of finding oneself on the same barricade "in disagreeable company" (from the fascist Almirante to the "moderate" Ronchey). Everybody who raises this objection (Antonio Baldassarre in the last fascicle of "Democrazia e diritto" [Democracy and law]) should recall that, during the Constituent Assembly (as Piero Aimo demonstrated), neither the PSI, nor the PCI worried much about the interest which the parliamentary right was also displaying in the single-chamber system. In second place, there is the tendency to exchange criticisms of the productivity of parliament with the criticism of the very existence of the democratic and representative system. In third place we have, as alternatives, the solution of the crisis through political means (the "communist issue") with the need for even drastic action regarding the entire constitutional setup. Thus we wind up presenting the executioner (bare political deals, the apparatus parties, and the machinery of consensus, etc.) with the victim (of the perfidious decisions of the Trilateral [conference] or plotting political scientists); the "new social subjects, as a new version of the demand for "room for the triumphant beast" (corporativism, qualunquism, etc.); the topic complex of democratic "decision making" as a demoniacal passion for the theoreticians of nazism (such as Karl Schmitt, Nietzsche).

In reality, the proposal to abolish the Senate is not backed up by any illusion. It is simply a measure aimed at making the political system more efficient and productive, doing away with the Levantine privilege of having the world's largest political stratum, the longest and most laborious legislative machinery, and a cabinet that meets less and less because it is involved in all kinds of deals.

Within the framework of democracy, the left, in my opinion, must also address itself to a proposal of "institutional engineering" (which is not the illuminist science of legislation), going beyond the 19th-century and

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reciprocal-guarantee "fashion model" between the political forces behind the constitution. Its political hypothesis (the transformation blueprint, the "third way" blueprint) can become credible and can become operative only through new institutional instruments and this is the only way one can satisfy the demand for strong innovations which is now coming from all social strata. Today instead we are in the situation of those French wine growers who tried to compromise (half-and-half) with the law against alcoholism and for care to be given to alcoholics.

This is a deadlock situation which anybody can resolve in an authoritarian direction, sweeping along a mass consensus behind himself, only because the worker movement has not managed to guide it in any other direction.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG GRADUATES TO REACH 100,000 BY 1982

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 20 Sep 79 p 9

[Article by Arturo Colombo: "The Problem of Youth Unemployment"]

[Text] It is useless to deceive ourselves. Youth unemployment, especially the unemployment of intellectuals (at the level of recent university and high school graduates), is not a passing phenomenon of the moment that can be solved rapidly and briefly, putting an end to the present impending specter of the rising tide of those who do not succeed in finding work.

The basic reason for this kind of situation (which also involves a threat of political and social revolts) appears to be very simple. The lack, for too many years now, of a sound, careful, strict framework, of a programming both in the developments of educational policy and in the objectives of the economic policy, cannot fail to cause a troublesome, growing difference between those who seek (at least) a modest job and the labor market, constantly less available to the reception of new forces and new energy.

The short-term and medium-term forecasts are anything but reassuring. They must be discussed, however, because nothing seems to me more hypocritical and misguided than to pretend not to see and not to know, deceiving (involuntarily perhaps) young persons on the future that will await them 3 to 4 years from now. There is so much talk of an excess, of an increasing surplus of recent university graduates, but what is the actual size of the phenomenon? If we take into account the orders of magnitude emerging from a study (still unpublished) made by Guido Birtig (and only partially reported on in Number 35 of MONDO ECONOMICO), there is enough to terrify us. In the course of 4 years, between now and 1982, no less than 365,000 graduates will come out of the greatest variety of university divisions. For how many will it be possible to find a job? And how many, on the other hand, will have to experience the nightmare of unfindable employment?

Let us give a few illuminating and, at the same time, disturbing examples. First of all, also as the result of a constant, senseless neglect of rural areas, the sectors connected with agriculture have less and less "room" to

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to receive young recent graduates. On the other hand, students in the college of agriculture are still being subjected to an excessive, abnormal "inflation." This is so true that, during the last 15 years, the number of students increased a good seven times, although the levels of preparation proved to be anything but satisfactory.

There is more. Although the excess of supply of recent graduates with regard to actual needs seems to be moderate and rather controllable in the "scientific" university divisions (physics, mathematics, and so on), the matter becomes much more critical and the prospects much more gloomy in the "technical" schools (engineering, architecture, veterinary medicine, and so on), in which it is likely that something like 15,000 new doctors will be out of work in the course of 3 to 4 years.

Naturally, the forecast situation becomes worse and to a much more serious degree, when account is taken of the composite fan of the so-called "humanistic" school -- letters or education, law or political science -- in which the boom of registered students is still at a very high level (especially in the south, where there are incredibly overcrowded universities, for example Rome, Naples, Bari, Palermo).

The assumption that these "humanistic" schools will succeed in turning out something like 250,000 graduates in the next 3 or 4 years suffices to take note of the incredible, terrifying gravity of the intellectual unemployment awaiting us. According to the estimates in the Birtig study, the surplus, the excess of recent graduates should amount, in 1982, to almost 72,000.

That is not all. If we add to this record figure the smaller but no less indicative figures of the probable "excesses" in the technical and scientific sector, the overall phenomenon will probably occur with a similar order of magnitude. At the relatively close sight of 1982, we shall have a little less than 100,000 recent graduates in excess!

Of course, part of these new doctors will be compelled (as is already happening now), in order to avoid hunger and the rage of unemployment, to find some expedient activity, perhaps in the ambiguous world of the so-called clandestine economy, in which clandestine work also involves those who have the piece of paper of the diploma or the degree in their pocket. But, what is worse, persistence of the economic crisis not only blocks any subsequent, potential "absorption." It compels the tertiary sector (which already right now employs the enormous majority of the graduates, practically over four-fifths.

The tertiary sector -- as everyone knows by now -- is largely, very largely, dominated by the government: state, government-controlled sector and also invisible government. The absurdity is that here is precisely where the only still somewhat elastic margins end by subsisting, in order to achieve some absorption of the new group of young persons.

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ITALY

COUNTRY SECTION

UIL LEADER INTERVIEWED ON INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 20 Sep 79 p 13

[Interview with Giorgio Benvenuto, secretary general of the Italian Union of Labor, by Paolo Glisenti]

[Text] Has this labor union lost credibility? A number of industrialists, assembled last Sunday in Villa d'Este for the Ambrosetti Seminar, said that its crisis is so grave that it must be wondered who the new interlocutor of Italy's business class may be in the future. Giorgio Benvenuto, secretary general of the UIL [Italian Union of Labor], comes from the "generation of '69." Together with Carniti and others, he shook up the old system of industrial relations violently in that memorable contractual time. At present, he is once more in the front line, ready to build the new labor union of the 1980's.

[Benvenuto] It is true. Today, the labor union has great power only negatively. We are strong enough to be able to prevent overtime in factories, but not to force, for example, FIAT to make new investments, so that the production capacity made available from blocking overtime may be utilized.

[Question] Do you also regret the lack of a credible interlocutor?

[Answer] It is a fact that, in the last few years, there has been no direct, constructive relationship between labor unions and CONFINDUSTRIA [General Confederation of Italian Industry]. We have taken serious steps backwards. Industrial relations that I describe as paleolithic have been set up. Take the metalworkers' contract. The direct negotiations with FEDERMECCANICA [Italian Metalworkers Federation] were reduced to a few hours and a large part of the controversial points were settled only with ministerial mediation. The result was that the "state's attorneys," the labor jurists, drew up an agreement that is introducing now, at the time of its implementation, enormous conflictual factors from the point of view of its interpretation. We stopped overtime in Lombardy because of a dispute over a few lire that FEDERMECCANICA is trying to refuse to acknowledge in the pay envelope. Is it really worth the trouble? Do you know what I say to you? De Benedetti is right. When it is possible, we must at least

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engage in political and ministerial intermediation. Labor unions and businessmen must negotiate directly, but this time with greater pragmatism. We need less talk about macroeconomics and more pragmatism. Say what you will, De Benedetti has at least the merit of speaking clearly, openly. He is the kind of interlocutor that we ask for.

[Question] Is De Benedetti right, perhaps, also when he talks about discharges as the only way to improve the accounts of businesses?

[Answer] His stand is provocative. We must achieve a more realistic way of talking. However, of course, it is a mistake to keep excess manpower in a plant.

[Question] Is this your first formula for productivity?

[Answer] That is the way things are. The labor union has two courses for getting out of the difficulty in which it is. The first one is to continue to defend ardently the sliding scale, wages, jobs. But we must realize that, in this field, the lines of withdrawal will be progressive. I give an example: we still say "no" to overtime in factories and we overlook the fact that "clandestine" overtime work is emerging more and more. If we do not resume control of the situation, we shall end up only by managing the welfare system of enterprises. On the other hand, I say that here it is not a question of mere belt-tightening, but, rather, of rolling up our sleeves. A little higher productivity will make greater wage margins and new jobs possible. That is a new subject requiring courage and involving the culture of the labor union.

[Question] Fine, but what do you propose practically?

[Answer] Let us start with the problem of overtime. All right, overtime is started again by contracting for it business by business. Here we must pay special attention to large businesses in difficulty. The labor union cannot get off by always blaming others.

[Question] Meanwhile, however, large businesses like FIAT and Alfa Romeo are in a critical situation, caught for years now in the grip of constant internal conflict. Is not greater productivity achieved by reducing conflicts?

[Answer] Yes, but FIAT and Alfa are afflicted by a controversy over contracts of a legal-interpretative type. In businesses in which the owner manages industrial relations personally, things go better. Arbitration mechanisms must be created to reduce room for individual and collective conflicts, as the British have done.

[Question] There are businesses in a state of crisis that cannot wait for the establishment of arbitration mechanisms. At least a truce might be needed in internal contracting. Do you agree?

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[Answer] In a certain way, yes. I say let us contract specific plans for the recovery of these businesses. Let us guarantee greater productivity, but let us try to see that the plans are implemented. These are the lines on which we are ready for a preferential treatment of those enterprises in crisis that must be put on their feet again. It is no longer possible to move forward by "burning up" the capital funds. Diversifying our attitude on conflicts does not mean, however, merely reducing wage demands. We have done so (I believe that business contracting in the metalworking sector involves amounts below 12,000 lire), but it was a losing line that led to a different conflict, focused on demands for change in classification and others. Therefore, we must be jointly responsible for supervision and management of recovery plans.

[Question] What other taboos are you ready to discuss?

[Answer] We want to discuss everything. Mobility, absenteeism, hours of work. This is my plan. Meetings with CONFINDUSTRIA and INTERSIND [expansion unknown] on these specific problems should be resumed. Concerning mobility, for example, the agreements made recently are important but inapplicable. An agreement should be found immediately that will provide mobility also between businesses in various sectors. It must be necessary to allow businesses incapable of recovering to shut down. Once an agreement has been found with CONFINDUSTRIA and INTERSIND it will be necessary to plan a legislative instrument that will provide mobility within the framework of a regional labor policy. On other problems -- industrial reconversion, sector plans -- meetings should be triangular, with the government.

[Question] Let us come back to the initial question. Are you a credible interlocutor? Can you assume and respect commitments?

[Answer] It is a sensitive point. We must fight against the bureaucratization of labor unions. We must guarantee greater transparency and representativeness in factories. We must cease regarding labor union officials and delegates as the rank-and-file. The workers are the real rank-and-file. The elections of factory councils must take this requirement into account. It is the basis for a truly reformist labor union movement.


[Question] Is this a process of renovation involving the labor union and the country in all its ramifications?

[Answer] Yes. The whole country is suffering from absurd rigidities: holidays lumped together, rest periods only on Saturday, business hours concentrated when consumers are working, newsstands closed Sunday afternoons, mail not delivered on holidays. Let us begin to contract in the metalworking sector for full utilization of the plants by rationalizing the work shifts. An additional 400 hours of production would be achieved. The fact is that we have taken a bad turn. I am especially afraid of a society that lives with little, because it works little.

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Shrinkage of productivity in the leading countries. Italy had the most serious decline between the two periods (1963-1973, 1973-1977).

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

UGT'S REDONDO INTERVIEWED, COMMENTS ON UNION-PSOE RELATIONS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 16-22 Sep 79 pp 22,23

[Interview with General Union of Workers Secretary-General Nicolas Redondo:  
"I will vote for Felipe"; date and place not given]

[Text] As far as Nicolas Redondo, Secretary-General of the UGT [General Union of Workers] and Socialist Party strongman is concerned, the debate on "Marxism, yes--Marxism, no" is nothing but beating about the bush. He does not agree with the party radicals nor does he declare himself to be a follower of Felipe although he will vote for Felipe Gonzalez during the next PSOE [Spanish Socialist Worker Party] congress.

Nicolas Redondo Urbieto, 51, a Basque, a metallurgist for more than 30 years in the old "La Naval" of Sestao, has been in the Socialist Party and the UGT ever since he was an apprentice machinist. He experienced underground activities, jail, and banishment under Francoism but he never wanted to resort to exile--perhaps because of his childhood experience.

"The truth is that I was exiled when I was 10 years old," recalls Nicolas Redondo. "Because of the bombing of Guernica, many parents thought that fascist bombings could be repeated against open cities and they feared for the lives of their children. Along with another about a hundred or so Basque boys, they put me on a boat headed for Bordeaux. From there they took us to a refugee settlement and I spent the whole war in the home of a French couple, a miner who had six children."

In 1974, in another French city, in Suresnes, where the PSOE held its last congress in exile, Nicolas Redondo was about to be elected party secretary-general. But he did not want to run and Felipe Gonzalez was elected in his place. In 1976, he was appointed secretary-general of the UGT by the congress and he was reelected in 1978.

This year, at the ILO in Geneva, Redondo dined with King Juan Carlos and, for the first time since he got married, he turned up there, wearing a necktie--although it was a borrowed one, at that. During his interview with

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Adolfo Suarez two months ago, he gave the prime minister a dressing-down over the way in which the administration had handled labor matters. In the Spanish socialist establishment, the secretary-general of UGT was historically an important personality. "The number-2 man?" CAMBIO16 asked. "No, no, number 1-1/2," replied two members of the UGT executive committee.

Question: Was the UGT much affected by the crisis which broke out in the Socialist Party this summer? Answer: It had no effect whatsoever in terms of organization because the party members were smart enough not to discuss the issues outside the PSOE. We received no reports and no complaints in the executive committee to the effect that there was any interference or tension because of that.

Question: One of the points in the polemic concerns the inclusion or omission of the word "Marxism" in defining the party. What do you think?

Answer: I believe that putting or omitting the word cannot be considered something fundamental and besides an abstract debate over just one term generates a certain degree of boredom. The important thing is not whether or not we put in the word "Marxism" but rather the party's class content deep down. During the last congress, the expectations that had been raised were frustrated by a lot of words and after that the people reacted in a serious manner and stopped talking too much.

Question: Does this answer signify criticism of the radicals?

Answer: This is not a matter of being in agreement with one group or another. It seems to me that, in a congress of this importance and in a situation such as the country finds itself in now, there had to be serious alternatives, it was necessary to create enthusiasm among the people, it was necessary to study and offer solutions to problems.

If you keep talking about Marxism, yes or Marxism, no, then you will forget another two traditions of the party that were fundamental: Ethical behavior and discipline. It gives me a pain in the neck when I hear people talk about an executive committee of synthesis. You can hold a leading position when the congress resolutions agree with your own political opinions. When that is not the case then you have to fight within the party for your own opinions. How could a member of the executive committee carry out and assure respect for a political line with which he does not personally agree?

Another point that is not being talked about in the party involves the basic sense of discipline because discipline also strengthens the party. No party can afford the luxury that our party can afford, where, when somebody does not agree on some point, he sends letters to the press or sounds off in an interview. That is not normal if the issue has first been resolved in a democratic debate giving rise to a majority orientation.

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Question: In other words, radically against the synthesis solution when it comes to electing the new executive committee?

Answer: The exact opposite of what we have said so far and if, by executive committee of synthesis, you mean that we have to have a percentage of members in proportion to the votes obtained on a certain issue, because that would presuppose recognition of tendencies. I continue to be a fervent supporter of what the party's position has always been: Democratic debate on all levels, followed by majority opinion prevailing, although the minority can defend its postures because tomorrow the minority may be the majority. But, of course, within the organization.

Question: Might there not be the danger that a minority of 20 or 30 percent might form a tendency after the next congress?

Answer: I do not believe so because I know most of the so-called radicals and they are by no means the kind of people who are inclined toward a split. I think that they are going to stick to their opinions within the organization but not as an organized tendency because that would destroy the party.

Question: Will many members of the preceding executive committee have to be replaced?

Answer: The party leadership must meet three requirements: Capacity for work, homogeneity in the leadership team, and controversy and debate with everybody defending his own opinions. It would be a good thing if the new executive committee were to contain a high percentage of manual workers. I am not saying this out of workerism but for the sake of balance and because the workers always contribute a rational approach to the basic problems.

Question: The topic of the centrist-socialist coalition government certainly will provide food for conversation during the next congress.

Answer: One may well say that the UGT is against the coalition government. I am totally against that, unless we were caught in a grave and critical situation or a political cataclysm. And I say this for political reasons, not out of ideological purism because, in my opinion, it would be a bad remedy for the two majority parties to form a coalition. Apart from the frustrations which this would produce among the entire people, it would be bad for democracy. What would an opposition, made up of little groups, do then if there were no short-term and medium-term alternatives?

Question: What about the possibility of the unity of the left?

Answer: That is very difficult. For the time being, I do not see it. And that includes the labor union area where our differences with the Workers Commissions are profound. This is due to the fact that the Commissions act in a manner subordinate to the Communist Party. The Socialist Party subordinates itself to the interests of the workers, in other words, the party falls in line with the criterion of the UGT on labor union and labor

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problems. Why does the exact opposite happen in the case of the communists where the labor union moves and acts in the interest of the party? Perhaps because the communists are always looking for a situation of influence superior to the number of deputies obtained and the percentage of votes they get and for that they exploit the labor unions and they subject the interests of the Workers Commission to their own.

Question: Unity of action is out, in other words.

Answer: I do not renounce unity of action but I do not agree to the idea that any other labor union headquarters should impose its political opinions on us when those opinions do not serve to defend the workers. We will not be quiet and we will not agree to any kind of manipulations. Today we are far removed from the Workers Commissions and the dynamics of the situation can involve us in confrontations because I will not allow things to be hidden from the working class.

Question: For example?

Answer: Well, proposing the idea--as the Workers Commissions did--that agreements be worked out with the political parties for a period of four years constitutes a serious attempt to put a ceiling on worker demands. Besides, it would mean shutting off the possibilities of a left-wing alternative because that would only serve to stabilize the Democratic Center Union while at the same time it would reduce participation in political life, I would say, and increase the people's frustration.

Question: Does Nicolas Redondo consider himself to be a follower of Felipe?

Answer: No, I have known Felipe Gonzalez for many years, just as I know other people in one or the other sector. I sometimes agree with Felipe and sometimes I do not but his behavior is in line with the party's ethical tradition which I mentioned earlier. Felipe Gonzalez has two things which are highly appreciated: No inclination toward demagoguery, something which is very positive in a person such as he, in his kind of job. And, then, his lack of political ambition. He does his job as a service to the party, so that the party in turn may serve the community at large.

Question: But would you vote for Felipe Gonzalez at the congress?

Answer: Yes, I would vote for him. But I want to say that I will vote for a program because programs are more important than persons. The program proposals must express economic aspects, unemployment, retirement, the younger generation, women. The worst that could happen to a party is to fall victim to the personality cult. I will never be in favor of one person or another. That does not mean that I cannot tell who would be better for the party.

Question: What is your judgment on the Management Commission?

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Answer: The Management Commission found itself facing a party frustrated by the outcome of the May Congress and a tremendously delicate situation. And it is doing a good job handling it. It has been impartial and its work was highly positive because it made sure to preserve the integrity of the PSOE.

Question: When will the new labor union elections be held?

Answer: We are not frightened by the elections. We believe they are necessary but the labor union headquarters as such should call for those elections without the government getting involved.

Question: And when are they to be held, during what month?

Answer: During the next several months we are going to get into a process of negotiating more than 2,000 collective bargaining agreements and that time does not look good for election. As far as the UGT is concerned, we will hold a special congress by the first of the year to determine the participation percentage of industry federations in regular congresses because so far they did not have a vote. And then we are going to hold our regular congress in May so that, for us, the ideal thing would be for the labor union elections to come thereafter.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

PCE SAID TO BE PLAYING POLITICAL GAME WITH STRIKES

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Sep 79 p 19

[Article by Jose Oneto: "The General Strike"]

[Text] The Communist Party which, during the Franco era, struggled unceasingly to achieve a peaceful general strike that would put an end to the dictatorship, has revived its old plan under democracy.

The Workers Committees, comprising the Communist-inspired trade union, are actually exploring the possibility of calling a general strike throughout all of Spain in mid-October in order to protest against the government's economic program, which they describe as an "attack on the workers' interests." This general strike which, according to reliable sources, would be strongly opposed by the Socialist trade union (UGT [General Union of Workers]), would be the conclusion of a process of social agitation and mass mobilization to attain "a progressive, negotiated solution to the economic crisis, based on medium-term politico-economic agreements between the leading sociopolitical forces and the government, as the only means of establishing a deepseated economic program that will provide for the interests of the workers and the nation as a whole."

The goal to be attained relates more to the political interests of the Communist Party, which is becoming progressively isolated, than to the labor-related interests of its union, the Workers Committees. As unbiased political observers have indicated, it is actually an attempt to return to the era of "consensus," and to the signing of new Moncloa agreements. To Santiago Carrillo's party, the signing of the Moncloa pacts and the reiterated request citing the need to form committees to follow up the pacts, entailed a reinforcement of the PC and a political leadership which was not in keeping with either the number of Communist representatives in Parliament nor, of course, with the number of votes won in the last two democratic elections.

The Moncloa agreements, to which the Communist leaders and the union that comes under their sphere of influence want to return, involved the active presence on the democratic political scene of a party which was persecuted and combated for over 40 years, and, in particular, participation in a kind

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of parallel government operating in the dark. During the transition, Mr Carrillo, the leader of European Eurocommunism, managed to come closer to power than his French and Italian comrades with many years of legal experience and struggle.

At the present time, the political picture has changed substantially. Since the last elections, the government party has been veering progressively toward the right (in accordance with the interests of its electorate), and has started to regain those who were disenchanted with an alleged "leftism." Now, the "great operation" is to break up the Democratic Coalition, and the first indications lie in Alfonso Osorio's rapprochement with the UCD [Democratic Center Union] and in Areilza's rapprochement with Adolfo Suarez. Once again, and based on predictions, Mr Fraga, who always makes a mistake when it is time to select his political allies, will remain alone.

Insofar as the left is concerned, the UCD has obviously reached agreement with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] on the eve of the party's special congress, at which Felipe Gonzalez will, in all probability, be reelected secretary general. The pact is of a trade union and parliamentary nature. In exchange for the return of the union holdings to the General Union of Workers, which was promised personally by the president of the government, Adolfo Suarez, the Socialist trade union has broken up the "battlefront" of the left which started to form in April at the time of the municipal elections.

The UGT, which rejects the government's economic plan, because it runs counter to the workers' interests, nevertheless is of the opinion that the current political and economic status of the country cannot withstand mobilization "for partisan purposes," because the agitation campaign proposed by the Committees, according to the Socialist union, has no trade union purpose, but is rather, "backing for the Communist Party's policy."

In the other aspect of the pact, last week the Socialist Party abstained in Parliament when the Communist Party submitted a bill on the workers statute, a bone of contention for the Communist and Socialist unions. Thanks to this UCD-PSOE pact, laws as controversial as the one on the constitutional court, the radio television statute and the workers statute itself, submitted by the government party, have not had any problems in Congress.

In view of this situation, all of the Communist Party's emphasis has been placed on the return to "consensus," although, in order to achieve it, it will have to resort to the old plan of the general strike, which caused Mr Carrillo so many troubles under the dictatorship.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BRIEFS

PCE MEMBERSHIP DRIVE--The Spanish Communist Party [PCE] plans to launch a campaign during the coming year of 1980, the sole purpose of which will be to double the number of members. The drive will attempt to reach the working sectors and women in particular. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Sep 79 p 5] 2909

UCD CONGRESS--In certain areas of the UCD [Democratic Center Union], consideration is being given to the possibility of moving ahead the party's second congress, scheduled for October 1980, and holding it in February of the same year. The maneuver is reportedly designed to "purge" the political council and the executive committee of certain troublesome personages. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Sep 79 p 5] 2909

PCE'S 'SOCIALDEMOCRATS'--There is a certain amount of uneasiness in the PCE's executive entity toward the Communist councilmen in the Madrid City Hall, who are thought to be assuming positions that are excessively "Socialdemocratic." The secretary general, Santiago Carrillo, met with them recently to criticize them for their silence toward the recent price increases for public transportation in the capital of Spain. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Sep 79 p 5] 2909

GENERALITAT PRESIDENT--The Catalan communists are ready to vote for Joan Raventos, secretary-general of the Catalan Socialist Party, as the next president of the Generalitat while they yield the post of prime minister in the Catalan government to the socialists. According to the communists of Antoni Gutierrez, this post should be compatible with the text of the charter. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 16-22 Sep 79 p 5] 5058

AIRCRAFT CARRIER--Work on the first aircraft carrier for the Spanish navy will begin at the Bazan shipyard in El Ferrol, in October. The vessel, which will become operational in 1982, will replace the obsolete "Dedalo," which is of American origin. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 16-22 Sep 79 p 5] 5058

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